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which ex-ante heterogeneous individuals make an educational investment early in their life 
and face a stochastic wage distribution. We characterize labor and education wedges in this 
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A well-established link exists between income inequality and education. In a recent
survey Acemoglu and Autor (2010) note that the college premium has been rising
steadily in the US for the last 45 years with no immediate end in sight. This widening
wage premium has contributed to an increase in the dispersion of the distribution
of wages and income also in other advanced economies (Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri
and Violante 2010). However, not all of the observed rise in the college premium is
necessarily caused by an increased demand for skills acquired in college to the extent
that unobserved skills inﬂuence wages and labor market outcomes in general. Taber
(2001) ﬁnds that at least some of the observed rise in the educational skill premium
should beattributed tounobservedskill heterogeneityrealizedbeforecollege decisions
are made.1 Furthermore, since heterogeneity is already realized at a very early stage
in life, individuals face very different returns to education, resulting in very different
incentives to invest into education2 Finally, it is well known that returns to education
are subject to substantial uncertainty.3
What are the implications of these empirical relationships for optimal policies?
How can non-linear labor taxes be used to dampen inequality? Should information
about one’s education level be included in the tax code? How should education poli-
cies be set and how are incentives to invest into human capital affected by the tax
code for ex-ante heterogeneous agents? What role do policies have to insure risk?
In this paper, we try to make progress on these important questions in a norma-
tive Mirrleesian framework, using both theory and numerical simulations. Although
previous papers have studied optimal taxation problems with endogenous educa-
tion, they have typically abstracted from either ex-ante heterogeneity or uncertainty,
or imposed exogenous restrictions on the available policy instruments (e.g. only lin-
ear taxes). To address this issue, we build a more realistic setting including both
ex-ante heterogeneity and uncertainty in educational returns. In addition, the set of
policy instruments is endogenous, arising solely from the informational structure of
the problem.
More formally, we study an environment characterized by private information,
which evolves stochastically over time. Ex-ante heterogeneous individuals are born
with different innate abilities θ and decide on their level of education z early in their
life. After education, agents learn their skill level a that can be interpreted as wage,
1Indirect evidence for the importance of unobserved skills comes from the strong persistence of
within education group inequality.
2See, for example, Lemieux (2006) or Carniero and Heckman (2003). We give a brief review of key
empirical ﬁndings guiding our modeling later in the paper.
3See, e.g., Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005).
2they work and generate income.4 The planner cannot observe innate ability θ, work
effort and the skill level a, so the resulting allocation must be incentive compatible at
every point in time. However, we do assume that the plannercan observe educational
investment z.
Labor market risk is taken into account in our model by the fact that individuals
face a distribution of wages before entering the labor market. Once they enter, they
learn their type a, which is private information. When deriving analytical results, we
try to impose minimal structure on the stochastic process and work with a general
conditional distribution function G(a|z,θ). Ex-ante heterogeneity manifests itself in
two ways: 1)Holdingeducation constant, the distribution ofskills tomorrow depends
on innate ability directly; and 2) the marginal return to education varies with the
innate type, i.e. the cross derivative of G(a|z,θ) with respect to θ and z is typically not
zero.
We are interested in characterizing the properties of constrained Pareto optimal
allocations and investigating decentralized implementations that can generate these
optimal allocations as a consequence of agents’ choices in markets. In the truthful
mechanism we employ, agents ﬁrst reveal their innate ability level ﬁrst, and only at a
later stage their labor market skill level. The second stage is a familiar Mirrlees prob-
lem, in which agents choose from consumption-income bundles. In the ﬁrst stage,
agents select from a menu of education levels and utility promises. Our analysis
shows that education can be understood as a screening device to separate agents in
an incentive compatible allocation early in life. The utility promises are tailored to
the endogenous skill distributions, which are functions of innate type and education.
To tackle the problem we employ a ﬁrst-order approach simplifying the set of incen-
tive constraints, and then verify ex-post whether the obtained allocations are indeed
incentive compatible.
A result arising immediately from the environment is the dependency of labor
wedges on education decisions; individuals with the same income face, in general,
different marginal distortions, unless they were also identical ex-ante. Conceptually,
we show that optimal implicit marginal labor tax rates in the dynamic case consist of
the sum of two parts: The ﬁrst is the standard marginal tax formula from the static
Mirrlees model for the Utilitarian planner obtained in Mirrlees (1971) and Saez (2001).
Conditional on the Pareto weight assigned to the innate type, the planner maximizes
expected utility in our dynamic model. In the static model, he tailors tax rates to the
skill distribution to optimally redistribute across skill levels. In the dynamic model
he does the same to optimally insure different innate types against labor market risk.
4After agents enter the labor market we assume no more shocks to ability. This is to strengthen
the focus on the education-taxation link. Recent papers which have characterized labor wedges in dy-
namic Mirrlees models with shocks occuring every period are Farhi and Werning (2011) and Golosov,
Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2010).
3Since the endogenous skill distribution is different for each innate type, there is one
insurance part of labor taxation for every initial type. For the second effect and to ﬁx
ideas, consider the case ofonlytwo innate typesθL and θH. Weshow thatthe marginal
tax rate at some income level y(a∗) for the low type θL depends positively on to the
difference: (1 − G(a∗|z,θH)) − (1 − G(a∗|z,θL)) = Pr(a > a∗|z,θH) − Pr(a > a∗|z,θL).
To look at a speciﬁc example, let us consider a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance order-
ing of the type space G(a|z,θH)  FOSD G(a|z,θL), so the above term is never negative.
The planner increases the marginal distortion for the low type proportional to the dif-
ference in order to deter a deviation from high types, who have a higher likelihood
of being a higher type than a∗ and therefore of being affected by this higher marginal
distortion through a decrease in consumption. Differences in the conditional distri-
bution are exploited in this way by the planner to effectively deal with the incentive
constraints in the ﬁrst period
The dependency of the tax schedules on characteristics other than income is re-
lated to the idea of tagging and income taxation, as ﬁrst proposed by Akerlof (1978).5
Whereas our analysis shares the feature of this method in that the social planner uses
additional information to tailor marginal tax rates for each educational level to the
respective skill distribution, it differs substantially in the sense that education is not
an immutable tag, but rather an endogenous variable. One might, therefore, label the
dependency of tax distortions on education as endogenous tagging.6
Our theory illustrates how individual education decisions are distorted by optimal
government intervention in constrained Pareto optimal allocations. This depends
again on two forces. First, implicit educational subsidies are used to offset the dis-
tortionary impact of the labor tax on educational decisions. This is equivalent to a
ﬁrst-best rule in a sense that innate ability would be observable. Second, the planner
distorts education to relax binding incentive constraints. If the desired redistribution
of income is downward (high to low innate types), we show that this imposes an im-
plicittax andhence adownward distortion ofeducation. Thekeyisthat thisimproves
the equity-efﬁciency trade-off for the planner, in the same spirit as positive marginal
labor tax rates relax incentive constraints in the static model.
We numerically illustrate these forces, parameterizing the skill distributions as log-
normal with a Pareto tail, following standard practice in the literature. We set the
location parameter of the log-normal to be a function of innate skills and education,
allowing for differing marginal returns to education across agents. We discipline our
parameter choice by matching monetary education expenditureson college education
in the US. Holding income constant, implicit marginal tax rates on labor income differ
5More recently tagging is investigated by Cremer, Gahvari and Lozachmeur (2010), Mankiw and
Weinzierl (2010) as well as Weinzierl (2011b).
6A similar logic arises in the recent paper of Scheuer (2011) in a model with endogenous occupa-
tional choices.
4byupto21%points acrossdifferenteducation levelsinournumericalexample. These
differences are mainly explained by tailoring marginal tax rates to the different skill
distributions. We ﬁnd only small second-order effects of the dynamic incentive effect
described above. For the education wedge we ﬁnd that it is mainly determined by
the ﬁrst-best rule and that the downward distortion to relax incentive constraints is
of minor magnitude.
We propose two ways to decentralize the optimum. In one implementation, the
government offers a non-linear schedule of grants to individuals. These grants are
linked to education levels. Agents self-select into education and use the grants to ﬁ-
nance tuition and consumption during education. After graduating they are free to
choose their work hours/effort and pay a labor income tax conditioning on their ed-
ucation choice. Together with a savings tax these polices can achieve the optimum.
Such history dependenttaxschedulesmightbeconsidered hard toimplementinprac-
tice, since they might be perceived as violating horizontal equity by society. Dealing
with that, we provide another implementation that is basically a reinterpretation of
the ﬁrst one: Agents are offered loans during their education period that are linked
to education levels. When working, all individuals face the same history - indepen-
dent tax schedule and in addition a loan repayment schedule that depends both on
income and on the size of the loan.7 Since the government effectively provides liquid-
ity to agents during their education, both implementation would also be applicable if
agents were credit constrained.
Finally, we present a simpler application of the model, using a binary education
decision, i.e. going to college or not. Importantly, this enables us to use estimates
of factual as well as counterfactual income distributions from the labor economics
literature (Cunha and Heckman 2007, 2008), both of which are needed as an input
to the model. Additionally, by reducing the dimensionality of the problem, a binary
education choice also signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity and sophistication of the
policy instruments, coming another step closer to practical policy recommendations.
For high-school and college graduates optimal implicit labor tax rates are both U-
shaped asin Diamond (1998)and Saez (2001). Marginal tax rates for college graduates
are ﬁrst higher then smaller, before both schedules converge to roughly the same top
tax rate. Using the high-school labor wedge schedule asthe common labor income tax
schedule, the implied income-contingent repayment schedule for college graduates is
hump-shaped. In expectation college graduates pay a small yearly premium over the
actuarially-fair annuity value of the loan they take from the government.
Related Literature. Several previous papers have studied problems of optimal
labor taxation and their relation to education decisions. One strand of inquiry has
7Income-contingent loan repayments areactually in place in Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, Nor-
way and New Zealand.
5worked undertheassumption ofex-ante homogeneityandriskyhumancapital. Grochul-
ski and Piskorski (2010) focus on the implications of unobservable human capital in-
vestment for capital taxation. Anderberg (2009) emphasizes that the risk properties
of human capital are crucial for the question whether and how education should be
distorted relative to a ﬁrst-best rule.8 Da Costa and Maestri (2007) show that human
capital should always be encouraged in a second-best environment. In contrast, our
model explicitly stresses the importance of heterogeneity, already at the point when
education decisions are made.
In a static setting with heterogeneity but without uncertainty, Bovenberg and Ja-
cobs (2005) analyze how endogenous education alters the result of the Mirrleesian tax
problem and conclude that distortions on the education margin through income tax-
ation should be offset by education subsidies. Relatedly, Bohacek and Kapicka (2008)
study a model in a dynamic environment with certainty and obtain similar results.9
Some of the mentioned papers analyze unobservable human capital investment and
some the observable case. Which assumption is appropriate depends on the exact re-
search question since in reality some parts of human capital are observable (type of
degree, student fees, years at college) and some parts are not (e.g. study behavior).
One aim of our paper is to argue that in an social optimum, using available public
information about human capital can act as a screening device; that is why we focus
on modeling the observable part of human capital investment.
Bénabou (2002) considers the case of heterogeneity and uncertainty. His approach
is different from ours in two ways: ﬁrst, he does not solve for constrained Pareto
optimal allocations, but instead focuses on given non-linear instruments: education
subsidies and income taxes. Second, he does not consider the optimum using both
instruments simultaneously, but rather compares the implications of education subsi-
dies with those of progressive income taxes for growth and efﬁciency. Our approach
is to derive the full optimum constrained only by informational asymmetries and
then discuss policy instruments implementing these allocations in line with the New
Dynamic Public Finance literature.
Two recent contributions have analyzed optimal labor wedges in dynamic Mirrlees
economies without endogenous education but with productivity shocks in every pe-
riod, which we abstract from. Farhi and Werning (2011) characterize the evolution of
the labor wedge over time analytically and numerically. Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvin-
ski (2010) derive and illustrate optimal labor wedges across agents in the case of no
8Focusing on linear policy instruments Anderberg and Andersson (2003) as well as Jacobs,
Schindler and Yang (2010) also discuss the importance of the risk properties of human capital.
9Kapicka (2006) introduces non-observable endogenous human capital into a dynamic, non-
stochastic Mirrlees model where taxes can only be conditioned on current income. He shows that
marginal tax rates are lowered due to the education margin. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) consider
observable and unobservable investment and provide an interesting discussion about different impli-
cations.
6income effects and non-separable preferences. Our analysis on labor wedges focuses
on differences across education levels in an optimal allocation and is, therefore, com-
plementary.
To make the dynamic incentive problem tractable, we employ a ﬁrst-order ap-
proach. Importantly, we rely on the fact that private information evolves sequentially
in our economy, which avoids solving a multidimensional screening problem. This
paper is, thus, related to work on dynamic mechanisms, in particular that of Pavan,
Segal and Toikka (2011) and Kapicka (2010), who study the validity and robustness of
the Mirrleesian ﬁrst-order approach in dynamic economies, as well as that of Courty
and Li (2000) who study optimal dynamic pricing of a monopolist.
Finally our paper builds on recent important work by Werning (2011), who shows
that decentralized implementations of incentive compatible allocations, which are
characterized by non-stochastic, non-linear capital taxes that may even be history in-
dependent, do exist.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basics of the model as
well as its empirical foundation and a short characterization of the Laissez-Faire allo-
cation. In Section 3, we investigate dynamic incentive compatibility and describe the
major properties of constrained efﬁcient allocations. Further on, we present quantita-
tive results with a calibrated example. Decentralized implementations of constrained
efﬁcient allocations are provided in Section 4. Using data from Cunha and Heckman
(2007, 2008) we apply our model to the case of a binary education decision in Section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
2.1 Heterogeneity, Education and Labor Market Outcomes: Some
Empirical Facts
We begin with a brief discussion of recent evidence and stylized facts from the em-
pirical literature on education and labor market outcomes and state how these guide
our modeling assumptions. These ﬁndings underscore the importance of the effect
of initial heterogeneity and risk on the returns to education. A series of papers have
used factor structure models to estimate returns to education (see Cunha and Heck-
man (2007) for a survey). Importantly, these methods can identify whole distributions
of returns (instead of ﬁrst and second moments only), do counterfactual analysis, and
distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post returns.
First, CunhaandHeckman(2008)documentconsiderableresidualuncertainty over
future returns at the time of the decision to go to college or enter the labor market di-
rectly after high school, even after controlling for heterogeneity.
7Second, for both groups, actual college and high-school graduates, the density of
lifetime earnings when going to college, lies to the right of the density when entering
the labor after high school indicating a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance shift. Note
that for high-school graduates the college density is estimated counterfactually and
vice-versa for college graduates.
Third, returns to education differ widely across individuals. Carniero and Heck-
man (2003) document that the return can differ by as much 19% points across indi-
viduals for one year of college. In this vein, the literature has documented a com-
plementarity effect – both cognitive and non-cognitive ability, either acquired early
during childhood or innate, increase the return of education. For example, Altonji
and Dunn (1996) ﬁnd that the return is higher for children whose parents are highly
educated; these parents are likely to be more able to transmit or instill their offspring
with higher initial human capital. Finally, there is evidence of a direct effect of these
early abilities on earnings. Taber (2001) presents ﬁndings suggesting that much of the
rise in the college premium may be attributed to a rise in the demand for unobserved
skills, which are predetermined and independent of education.
2.2 The Model
Individuals, whose mass is normalized to one, live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period
individuals acquire human capital and in the second period individuals work. The
labor market ability in period two, however, is stochastic in period one. The distribu-
tion of labor market abilities depends on educational investment and initial type. We
now formalize these ideas.
In period one individuals differ in innate ability θ, which can be interpreted as
a one dimensional aggregate of (non-)cognitive skills and family background and is
distributed in the interval [θ,θ] according to F(θ). When individuals learn their type
θ, which is private information, they make an educational investment. z10
In period two individuals draw their labor market ability a from a continuous con-
ditional distribution G(a|z,θ), which depends on innate ability θ and education z, and
has bounded support [a,a]. When individuals learn their type a they make a labor-
leisure decision.
To sharpen a few analytical results, it turns out helpful to place some structure on
the behavior of G(a|z,θ):
Assumption 1: G(a|z′,θ)  FOSD G(a|z,θ) ⇔ G(a|z′,θ) ≤ G(a|z,θ), for all z < z′.
10Reducing education to a one-dimensional, monetary variable is admittedly a simpliﬁcation of
reality. Nevertheless, we think it is reasonable to downsize the complex education process like this
since it captures the important fact that more education always requires more resources and makes the
analysis tractable.




These assumption will not be needed to derive our main results, but help to il-
lustrate important aspects of the model. Whenever an assumption is needed for a
result, we refer to it. The ﬁrst and the second one capture the notion that education
and the innate ability level should both have a direct effect on labor market outcomes
represented by a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance shift. The third one captures their
interaction and respects the compelling evidence of complementarity between early
ability and education.
2.3 Laissez Faire Equilibrium
To lay out the basic properties of the model, we start with the characterization of
the government intervention free laissez-faire equilibrium. In the second period, af-
ter agents have learned their labor market skill a, they choose labor supply, taking







s.t. c2 = y + Rs(θ).
Individuals’ utility functions are well-behaved – u(.) is assumed to be increasing, at
least twice continuously differentiable and concave, and Ψ(.) is assumed to be in-
creasing, at least twice continuously differentiable and convex. The parameter a is an
individual’s labor market skill, meaning individuals with a higher a need to provide
less labor effort to earn any income y.
In the ﬁrst period, agents decide how much to invest into education, and make
a consumption-saving decision. Agents have access to a risk-free one period bond
market; we impose no short-sale or enforcement constraints and an exogenous gross
return R. This deﬁnes the indirect utility function:





v2(a,s)g(a|z,θ)da s.t. c1 + z = −s.
As already anticipated in the last Section, we model the conditional distribution of
skills g(a|z,θ) as being determined by an agent’s education level z and her innate
ability θ. Moreover, we focus on educational investment as a direct monetary cost.
This is consistent with the idea that tuition fees and other monetary expenses are the
most important factors on the cost side driving educational decisions. It is also in line
with a foregone earnings interpretation, where more education delays labor market
entry. z can be a sum of both factors. In our numerical simulations in Section 5 we
9explicitly allow for the fact that different levels of education last a different number
of periods.
We now present the main properties of the equilibrium without government poli-
cies:
Proposition 2.1. The Laissez-Faire allocation has the following properties:

















(iv) If Assumptions 1-3 hold, educational investment is increasing in innate ability and sav-
ings are decreasing, i.e. z′(θ) > 0 and s′(θ) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Parts (i)-(iii) follow directly from the ﬁrst-order conditions. They are unsurprising
properties, stating that private marginal rates of substitution are equated to technical
marginal rates of transformation on the labor, capital, and education market.
Part (iv) states that without government policies, education and savings are mono-
tone in innate ability θ if Assumptions 1-3 are fulﬁlled. The proof provides instructive
intuition for this result. It is sufﬁcient to show that the objective deﬁned by (2.3) is
supermodular in all choice variables and type θ (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).
Plugging in the budget constraint gives the problem reduced to two choices s and z:
maxs,z U(s,z;θ,a,β) = u(−s−z)+β
  a
a v2(a,s)g(a|z,θ)da. This objective is supermod-










In Appendix A.1 we show that all inequalities hold. Equations (1) and (2) imply that
the return to savings is lower for higher θ types and with higher education, since
expected labor skills are also higher. Equation (3) holds, since innate abilities and ed-
ucation are complementary to each other. Taken together the direct effects of being of
higher type on credit and education are being reinforced by the relationship between
the endogenous variables.
So far, we have assumed no limits on the ability of agents to borrow against future
labor income. Imposing an ad-hoc constraint of the form s ≥ φ, where φ is some neg-
10ative number, leaves most of the results from Proposition 2.1 unaffected.11 Notably,
constrained agents will not be able to smooth consumption intertemporally as much
as desired. Still education levels will be increasing in type:
Corollary 2.2. Suppose Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. If agents face borrowing constraints s ≥ φ,
education is still monotone in type θ, i.e. z′(θ) > 0 in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Proof. Above some threshold type, agents reach the borrowing limit and set s equal
to φ. Of those agents higher types still face the greater returns to education because
of the complementarity and therefore choose a higher level of z.
The empirical literature has also documented sorting into education, based on het-
erogeneous expected returns (Cunha and Heckman 2007). The monotonicity of edu-
cation in the laissez-faire equilibrium is consistent with that fact.
For later purposes when we analyze optimal allocations and the respective tax sys-
tems that can implement such allocations, it is useful to deﬁne three wedges. They
are equal to implicit marginal tax rates on savings, labor income and education, re-
spectively:
Savings wedge:





Importantly, like all wedges the intertemporal wedge is deﬁned for any given allo-
cation. It is the proportional adjustment needed in the rate of return to make the
Euler equation hold for an agent θ, given the particular allocation. It follows that in
any allocation, there are as many wedges as agents – one for each innate skill level.
τs(θ) > (<)0 implies a downward (upward) distortion of savings. The same is true
for the following wedge.
Laborwedge: The laborwedgeisnonzeroifanindividual would liketo work more or
less at the intervention-free market price (which is her productivity level a). Formally
the labor wedge reads as:









It again has to be evaluated for a given allocation and there exists exactly one labor
wedge for every type vector (θ,a).
11Surveying the literature, Carniero and Heckman (2003) conclude that short-term borrowing con-
straints seem to have only a very small effect on educational decisions.
11Educational wedge: The education wedge is nonzero if the individual wants to ob-
tain more or less education if it could do that at the market price z. Formally it reads
as








In this case, a positive wedge corresponds to an upward distortion of education.
Inthedecentralizedsystems welaterpropose forthe implementationofconstrained
Pareto efﬁcientallocations, we willshow, which ofthese implicittaxeson laborincome,
savings and education will equal explicit marginal taxes
3 Constrained Pareto Optimal Allocations
In this Section we characterize constrained Pareto efﬁcient allocations, where ’con-
strained’ refers to the government being unable to observe agents’ type θ in period
one and a in period two. In Subsection 3.1, we show that the problem is tractable
using a ﬁrst-order approach. In addition we provide necessary as well as sufﬁcient
conditions for this approach to be valid. In Subsection 3.2, we analyze optimality con-
ditions and its consequences for optimal policies. In Subsection 3.3, we show how the
results are extended to a T-period framework and in Subsection 3.4, we explore the
implications for optimal policies using numerical simulations.
3.1 Incentive Compatibility
We cast the problem as a sequential, dynamic mechanism – agents report an initial
type θ in the ﬁrst period, and, after uncertainty has materialized, report their produc-
tivity a in the second period. The planner assigns initial consumption levels c1(θ) and
education levels z(θ) to individuals with innate ability θ. Moreover, with each report
there comes a sequence of utility promises for the next period {v2(θ,a)}a∈[a,a]. In the
second period the screening takes place over consumption levels c2(θ,a) and labor
supply y(θ,a). All these quantities deﬁne an allocation in the economy. Dynamic in-
centive compatibility is ensured backwards, so we start analyzing the problem from
the second period.12
3.1.1 Second Period Incentive Compatibility
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Suppose
in the ﬁrst period agents have made truthful reports r(θ) = θ, although this is not
12A similar ﬁrst-orderapproachcan be readilyappliedint the case of a discrete choice for education;
i.e. the planner deciding which agents to send to college and which not. Incentive compatibility has
then to be characterized using modiﬁed envelope theorems in the spirit of Milgrom and Segal (2002).
12necessary and just simpliﬁes the exposition. Conditions for this to be true are given
in the next Section. Conditional on this report, the second period incentive constraint
must be met for any history of types (θ,a) and reporting strategy r(a):











Deﬁne the associated indirect utility function of the agents as:
v2(θ,a) = max
r(a)






Like in a standard Mirrleesian problem preferences satisfy single-crossing for given
ﬁrst-period reports. For global incentive compatibility it is, hence, necessary and suf-











and the usual monotonicity condition, stating that y(θ,a) is non-decreasing in ability




3.1.2 First Period Incentive Compatibility
Importantly, in the ﬁrst period an agent takes into account the effect of her report
about θ on future utility. First period incentive compatibility is ensured if and only if
the double continuum of weak inequalities holds:




≥u(c1 (r(θ))) + β
  a
a
v2(r(θ),a)dG(a|z(r(θ)),θ) = U(θ,r(θ)), ∀θ,r(θ), (5)
where U(θ,r(θ)) is the expected utility of an individual of type θ reporting r(θ). The
associated value function is:
V (θ) = max
r(θ)




13We proceed by replacing the set of inequality constraints deﬁned by (5) by local enve-










Innate ability affects the indirect utility function directly through the serial corre-
lation in types only. This localization of incentive constraints to make the problem
tractable is only valid if they imply a maximum from the point of view of the agents
for a truthful report and also imply global incentive compatibility. We now proceed by
characterizing necessary conditions for local and then global incentive compatibility.





For a local maximum it is necessary that:
∂2U(θ,θ)
∂r(θ)2 ≤ 0.

























We summarize these ﬁndings in the following Lemma:



































This Lemma provides necessary or localized conditions for any incentive compat-
ible allocation. Its ﬁrst part (i) can be conveniently included into any Lagrangian or
optimal control problem. Part (ii) can be interpreted as follows:
∂2U(θ,θ)
∂r(θ)∂θ ≥ 0 holds if
the initial type θ and the report r are complements. The expression can be decom-
posed into two terms. The ﬁrst term captures the idea that promised utilities should
14be tailored to different distributions of different initial types; roughly spoken higher
initial types should have relatively higher promised utilities in better states. The sec-
ond term enters this condition due to the endogenous investment z(θ) and captures
the idea that individuals with higher returns to education should receive a higher
level of education. Parts (iii) and (iv) are the well-known envelope and monotonicity
condition from the static Mirrlees problem, holding the innate type θ constant. Like
in the standard problem parts (iii) and (iv) are necessary and sufﬁcient, which can be
shown by a standard proof.
Asoften done in screening problems, our strategy for solving the second-best prob-
lem is to work with a relaxed problem with only restrictions (4) and (6) being imposed
and then check ex-post whether incentive compatibility is fulﬁlled. In the numerical
explorations in Section 3.4 we ﬁnd that incentive compatibility is always satisﬁed and
therefore the ﬁrst-order approach is valid for the considered primitives.
We now present a result that is interesting especially from a theoretical point of
view.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, and conditions (i),(iii),(iv) of Lemma 3.1







then the considered allocation is incentive compatible.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This Lemma implies that instead of directly ex-post verifying whether period one
incentive compatibility is satisﬁed in an allocation, one can alternatively check these
two simple monotonicity conditions. If they are fulﬁlled, then the allocation is in-
centive compatible. However, for both to be fulﬁlled is sufﬁcient and not necessary.
Whereas condition (ii) was always fulﬁlled in our numerical examples, condition (i)
often was violated for low a; we will comment on the reasons in Section 3.4 when we
present numerical illustrations of the model.
Our results on dynamic incentive compatibility are related to previous work in the
optimal non-linear pricing literature by Courty and Li (2000). They study optimal
pricing schemes of a monopolist facing consumers with stochastic tastes. In our case
the distribution of types tomorrow is endogenous, since education is a choice. In
recent contributions, Kapicka (2010) as well as Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2011) inves-
tigate the robustness and validity of the Mirrleesian ﬁrst-order approach in a large























where R is the gross return on savings. We let the planner assign Pareto weights
˜ F(θ) to individuals, depending (solely) on their initial skill level. Any distribution of
these weights, which we normalize to satisfy
  θ
θ
˜ f(θ)dθ = 1, corresponds to one point
on he Pareto frontier. λR denotes the multipliers on the resource constraint and η(θ)
the multiplier function of the ﬁrst-period envelope conditions. In Appendix A.3 the
Lagrangian and the ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem are stated. We now charac-
terize the wedges of second-best allocations.
3.2.1 Savings Distortions
It turns out that the presence of education, which endogenously affects the probabil-
ity distribution of tomorrow’s skills, does not change the prescription of a positive
intertemporal wedge, stemming from the optimality of the Inverse Euler equation
in dynamic Mirrleesian models.13 Some manipulations of the ﬁrst-order conditions
yield the following proposition:



















Proof. See Appendix A.4.1.
Jensen’s inequality then implies βE [u′(c2(θ,a))] > u′(c1(θ)) – the optimal allocation
dictates a wedge between the intertemporal rate of substitution and transformation;
savings are discouraged.
13Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson (1985) were the ﬁrst to derive it. In an important
paper reviving the interest in the result, Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) generalized it to
a large class of dynamic environments, most importantly allowing for arbitrary skill processes. Much
like the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) prescription of uniform commodity taxes, the robustness of a
positive intertemporal wedge relies on the (weak) separability of consumption and work effort.
163.2.2 Labor Distortions
The following proposition characterizes the optimal labor wedge.14































∂ [1 − G(a|z(θ),θ)]
∂θ
η(θ),
where εu(θ,a) (εc(θ,a)) is the uncompensated (compensated) labor supply elasticity of type
(θ,a).
Proof. See Appendix A.4.2.
Elasticities play a double role for the optimal labor wedge. On the one hand, a
higher compensated elasticity increases the excess burden of labor distortions and is
therefore inversely related to optimal labor wedges; on the other hand, a higher un-
compensated elasticity translates into higher income inequality for a given skill distri-
bution, making insurance more valuable and therefore tends to increase optimal labor
wedges. Moreover, the weighted mass ag(a|z(θ),θ) of agents whose labor supply is
distorted by the tax is negatively related to the marginal tax reﬂecting a deadweight
loss argument. The term u′(c2(θ,a)) can be interpreted as capturing income effects-
for individuals with low consumption income effects are stronger and therefore the
disincentive effect of marginal tax rates is weakened.
Conceptually, the labor wedge consists of two parts. The ﬁrst one A(θ,a) is a vari-
ation of the optimal tax formula in the static Mirrlees case, with the difference that
for each initial type θ there is one separate tax function A(θ, ). A(θ,a) disappears, if
agents are risk neutral, and therefore second period insurance is not a concern. With
risk-aversion, however, optimal policies provide insurance against the labor market
14In a recent paper Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2010) provide formulas for dynamic optimal
labor wedges with exogenous human capital, connecting them to empirical observables in the spirit of
the contributions of Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) for the static Mirrlees model.
17risk agents face. Education enters through its effect on the conditional distribution
of skills. The interpretation is analogous to the case with a utilitarian planner in the
static model. Fixing θ, the bigger the difference in the marginal costs of providing
a utility increase to agents with skill above a relative to the corresponding marginal
cost for lower skilled agents, the higher the tax rate at the skill pair (θ,a). The term is
equivalent to the tax formula from the standard static Mirrlees problem with utilitar-
ian welfare weights and, as shown in Appendix A.4.2, it can be rewritten as in Saez
(2001).
The second term B(θ,a) is novel and shows how labor tax rates are used to op-
timally supply dynamic incentives. In contrast to A(θ,a) it is independent of risk-
preferences, but vanishes with ex-ante homogeneous agents. Fixing a, the implicit
tax rate is proportional to
∂[1−G(a|z(θ),θ)]
∂θ , which measures the change in the probability
of becoming a higher type than a. Higher initial types have, education constant, a
higher probability of reaching a skill level above a. For two neighboring θ the planner
adjusts the labor wedge of the lower type to deter a deviation in the ﬁrst-period. The
increase in the implicit marginal tax rate increases average taxes for all skills a∗ ≥ a
and makes mimicking unattractive for the higher type.15
A no-distortion at the top and bottom goes through, since B(θ,a) = B(θ,a) =
A(θ,a) = A(θ,a) = 0.
3.2.3 Education Distortions
The following proposition characterizes optimal education policies.




















Proof. See Appendix A.4.3.
The ﬁrst term captures the marginal ﬁscal gain of an increase in education. Inte-
















15In principal, η(θ) might be negative. For redistributive preferences, however, i.e. non-increasing
Pareto weights, η(θ) is usually positive. In our numerical simulations that are based on utilitarian





∂a are both positive. Under Assumption 1
the derivative
∂G(a|z(θ),θ)
∂z(θ) is negative. A higher level education always increases the
expected transfer from an individual to the government. Indeed, later we present an
implementation of the optimum, in which y(θ,a)−c2(θ,a) is equal to the labor tax an
individual pays, i.e. there exists a ﬁscal externality. The education wedge offsets the
distortion arising from the labor wedge on the education margin.16





∂a positive everywhere by second period incentive compatibility.
Further, for redistributive preferences η(θ) is typically positive. Then the second part
of the education wedge is negative and acts as an implicit tax on education. By down-
ward distorting education, the planner relaxes binding incentive constraints and can
redistribute more effectively in line with her preferences. This is a consequence of the
complementarity assumption, stating that agents endowed with higher innate skills
gain more from education at the margin. The bundle of a lower type, hence, becomes
less attractive from the perspective of an agent if education is downward distorted.
Such an intuition is familiar from the standard static Mirrlees model concerning pos-
itive marginal income tax rates on the interior of skill set. Relatedly, for this incentive
term a zero at the top and at the bottom (θ,θ) of the innate ability distribution holds.
3.3 Extension to T Periods
For expositional convenience, we have worked with a two period model so far. We
next extend the results to a life-cycle context. We assume no further shocks to one’s
labor skill level after education. This is to strengthen the focus on the education and
taxation link, while it also keeps the problem tractable. It is also in line with recent
results from Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2010), who ﬁnd that heterogeneity realized
at the age of 23 contributes more to variability in lifetime earnings than subsequent
shocks.
Let Te be the number of years education takes place and Tw the number of years an
individual works, such that Tw + Te = T. During education, so for the ﬁrst Te years
in the life-cycle, consumption is constant and given by ce(θ), since there is certainty
within the education period; due to the same reasoning consumption during the work
period, cw(θ,a) is also constant. Further, it can be shown that the labor supply distor-
tions are constant over time (Werning (2007)) and therefore yw(θ,a) is constant.
However, whereas there is no intertemporal wedge within the years of education
and within one’s working life, the inverse Euler equation still governs the relation-
ship between ce(θ) and cw(θ,a) generating the familiar savings distortion. Assuming
βR = 1, labor wedges are simple extensions of the expressions in Proposition 3.3,
16A similar relationship holds in the static model of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).
19with cw(θ,a),ce(θ) replacing c2(θ,a),c1(θ). The education wedge takes into account























with βR = 1.
3.4 Numerical Illustration
This Section analyzes the derived properties numerically. We are not looking to pro-
vide a deﬁnite calibration, but rather numerically illustrate the theory here. Later
in Section 5, we apply our model to the case of binary education decisions, i.e. col-
lege vs. high school using estimated counterfactual distributions from the literature,
which uses panel data of labor market outcomes. We run two different sets of simu-
lations, since they complement each other in the sense that the numerical example in
this Section illustrates the optimal wedges with many ex-ante types, whereas for the
simulation in Section 5 with only two types we can make use of real world data.
For the numerical illustration we set ˜ f(θ) = f(θ), i.e. we solve for the utilitarian
optimum. We assume log utility




as e.g. in Farhi and Werning (2011) and Weinzierl (2011a), and set σ = 3, implying
a Frisch elasticity of 0.5. We assume one period to be one year. Education lasts four
years and the working life lasts 45 years in our numerical illustrations. The yearly
risk-free rate is assumed to be 3% (R=1.03) and β = 1/R.
Following common practice in the optimal taxation literature, we assume that abil-
ities are distributed log-normally with a right side Pareto tail. We specify the location
parameter of the log-normal   distribution to be a function of θ and z:
 (θ,z) =  B + bθ
c + dz
e + fθz






∂θ∂z > 0 for positive pa-
rameters b,c,d,e and f. For the log-normal distribution, Levy (1973) shows that an
increase in the location parameter  , holding the scale parameter σ constant, implies a
FOSD-shift. ThisFOSD-property carries over to to a log-normal distribution extended
by a Pareto tail in our reported simulation as well as in all unreported simulations.
20Thus, given that the FOSD-property carries over, (i) and (ii) imply Assumptions 1
and 2. However, note that (iii) that does not necessarily imply Assumption 3 to be
fulﬁlled.17 We set the scale parameter to σ = 0.565 and append a Pareto tail aP = 42.5,
following Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009). We chose the ‘thickness’ parameter
equal to two for the tail.18
We work with ten different initial skill levels θ, which are uniformly distributed
in [0.1,1]. We assume constant marginal costs of education and choose them and the
parameters  B,e,b,c such that with an approximation of the current tax and college
subsidy system in the USthe model roughly replicates per-capita expenditures on col-
lege education and, since the model produces ten endogenous skill distributions, the
interval of the location parameters of the log-normal parts across these distributions
contains the empirical one.19
Figure 1 plots four exemplary density functions for two levels of θ and z, highlight-
ing how a higher initial type and a higher education level translate into a right shift
of the distribution and a smaller peak.
Figure 2 shows the optimal labor wedges as a function of labor income. For ev-
ery initial type θ the labor wedge schedule follows a U-shaped pattern in the begin-
ning and then convergence to constant implicit marginal tax rates for high incomes.
This pattern mirrors ﬁndings from the static Mirrlees model (Saez 2001 and Diamond
1998). Holding income constant, the labor wedge is ﬁrst increasing in initial type θ.
The difference becomes as large as 21% points between the highest and lowest θ. The
reason isthathigherinitialtypesθ haveskill densitiesto theright oftheircounterparts
with lower θ fortwo reasons: the direct effectof θ on G(a|θ,z) andthe indirect through
z which is increasing in θ. Consequently, especially for the beginning of the skill dis-
tributions, higher labor wedges are less distorting for higher θ types, since there is a











∂θ∂z might be positive, if ∂
2G
∂µ∂z is sufﬁciently large.
18Saez (1999) shows that the thickness tail parameter of the income distribution converges to
γ
1+ ¯ ζu,
where ¯ ζu is the limiting uncompensated elasticity of labor supply and γ the tail parameter of the skill
distribution. The utility function we use implies ¯ ζu = 0. Since the empirical literature agrees on a
Pareto tail parameter of two for earnings and wages, our choice for γ is a value of two.
19Following Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2011) we set the labor income tax to a ﬂat rate of 27%
and a lump sum transfer of one sixth of labor income per capita. We introduce a yearly education
subsidy of 24%. With µB = 2,b = 0.7,c = 1,d = 0.3,e = 0.2,f = 0.01 the model produces average
education expenditures of about 29.57% of yearly income per education year (data: around 30.0%,
Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2011))and a distribution of realizedµ(θ,z) given the above parameters
within therange[2.21,2.95](data: 2.76,Mankiw, WeinzierlandYagan (2009)). Asarobustness checkwe
try out alternative parameterizations giving a smaller range of µ(θ,z)’s, giving very similar qualitative
results.
20Since low income distortions are strongly increasing in θ, condition (i) of Corollary 3.2 is typically
not fulﬁlled for low a.



































Figure 1: Skill Distributions
rates on higher θ types, raising tax revenues with less distortions. Since the ‘hump’ of
the densities of a is shifted to the right for higher θ, labor wedges decrease in θ in re-
gions where the mass is increasing in θ. For large incomes all labor wedges converge
to a similar top rate because all distributions are characterized by a Pareto tail. The
differences in the tails can become as big as 4% points, however.
We also distinguish between the insurance motive A(θ,a) and the incentive effect
B(θ,a) of Proposition 3.3. We ﬁnd a modest quantitative contribution of the incentive
effect at all skill levels with an average of 2.56% percentage points. Figure 3 illustrates
the decomposition for θ5, i.e. an intermediate innate ability level; we choose to illus-
trate the decomposition for this type because η(θ) is hump-shaped and therefore the
dynamic incentive effect is most pronounced for intermediate θ-types. The incentive
effect is particularly strong for low a; this pattern holds for all θ-types. The reason is
that ∂G
∂θ is particularly strong for low a due to the properties of the log-normal distri-
bution.
Figure 4 plots the education wedge across innate types and its decomposition into
the ﬁscal partandthe incentive partaccordingto Proposition 3.5. The implicitsubsidy
to education is always positive and varies between 40% and 47%. The ﬁscal effect
contributes quantitatively more than the incentive effect. The wedge also inherits its
shape from the ﬁscal externality. The incentive effect is U-shaped and varies between
0 (no distortion at the top) and -2% points. Finally, we ﬁnd an increasing savings
wedge between 17% and 29% across initial types.
















Figure 2: Labor Wedges
4 Implementation
So far we only considered a direct mechanism, in which individuals make reports
about their realized type and the planner assigns bundles of consumption, labor sup-
ply and education levels as functions of the reports. The focus in the characterization
of the optimal allocation was on wedges or implicit price distortions of the alloca-
tion. In this Section, we leave the abstract setting with no markets and explore two
decentralized implementations of the constrained optima. In the ﬁrst, individuals
self-select into education and are offered government support conditioning on the
education level chosen. When entering the labor market, income tax schedules will
condition on education. The second implementation is closely related. Individuals
also self-select into education; the difference is that the government support (condi-
tional on educational choice) is not interpreted as a grant but rather as a loan. During
their working life, individuals pay back an amount of the loan, which depends both,
on their income and education level. In addition, there is an income tax schedule in
place that conditions on income only. Both implementations are independent of the
functioning of private credit markets since the government provides liquidity during
education. We will ﬁrst present the implementations for the two-period model and
then generalize the results to the T period case.
















Figure 3: Decomposition of the Labor wedge




































































Figure 4: Educational Wedge
4.1 Implementation 1: Student Grantsand Income TaxesCondition-
ing on Education
4.1.1 Two Periods
The benevolent government, taking the role of the planner, offers a menu of student
grants to the agents. These grants G are conditional on education. In the second
period, there is a tax schedule in place, which, importantly, doesnot only condition on
earnings but also on educational investment. Further, savings taxes are high enough
to make private savings disappear from the market; the deﬁnition of the savings tax
builds on Werning (2011). We summarize this in the following proposition:
24Proposition 4.1. Any constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a two period economy can
be implemented by a Grant schedule G(z), an education dependent income tax T(y,z) and a
savings tax T s(s), where
• G(z(θ)) = z(θ) + c1(θ)
• T(y(θ,a),z(θ)) = y(θ,a) − c2(θ,a)
• T s(s) as deﬁned in Appendix A.5.
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Implementationofthesavingswedges: Thesavingsfunction T s(s)isprohibitively
high such that all agents choose s = 0, hence in this implementation there are no pri-
vate savings. However, as shown in Werning (2011) this comes without loss of gener-
ality: by a Ricardian equivalence argument, we can adjust G(z(θ)) and T(y(θ,a),z(θ))
with lump-sumtransfersanddeductiblestoarrivewith anon-linearsavingstaxsched-
ule, which produces non-zero private savings for every agent and the same allocation
with the same distortion of consumption across periods. The full argument is found
in Werning (2011).
Implementation of the labor wedges: Agents enter the second period with no
savings as argued above. Their budget constraint is then: T(y(θ,a),z(θ)) = y(θ,a) −
c2(θ,a). From the agents’ optimality conditions for y and c2 it follows that marginal
tax rates Ty(y(θ,a),z(θ)) are equal to labor wedges τy(θ,a) as characterized in Sec-
tion 3.2.2.
Implementation of the education wedges: To ﬁx ideas, the budget constraints of
an agent in both periods are given by:
c1(θ) + z(θ) ≤ G(z(θ))
c2(θ,a) ≤ y(θ,a) − T(z(θ),y(θ,a)),
where we already imposed the zero savings. In contrast to the optimal labor wedge,
which equals the optimal labor tax, there is no single policy instrument for which the
education wedge equals the marginal distortion of the policy. Instead, the govern-
ment uses two instruments: i) the non-linear grant schedule G(z), which depends on
education chosen and ii) the labor tax code in the second period. Using the agents’









25A positive value of τz(θ) encourages education at level θ. The incentive for agents
to increase their educational attainment comes from: i) An increase in their grant
measured by G′(z)21 and ii) an increase or decrease in their labor income tax burden
for all states, i.e. Tz(y(θ,a),z(θ)).
4.1.2 T Periods
The possible extension to the life-cycle case is summarized as follows:
Corollary 4.2. Any constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a T-period economy can be im-
plemented by a Grant schedule G(z), an education dependent income tax Tt(yt,z) that condi-
tions on the history of incomes and a savings tax T s(s).
Proof. See Appendix A.6
The corollary is an application of insights from Werning (2007), who characterizes
possible implementations in the dynamic deterministic Mirrlees problem. The prob-
lem here is similar to his model with the only difference that there is not only one tax
schedule conditioning on the history of incomes yt, but rather one for each θ-type or
each education level z.
One might wonder why the optimum is not simply implementable with time in-
dependent schedules. The reason is that with such a tax system it might be possible
for an individual to proﬁt from tax arbitrage, if tax schedules are sufﬁciently concave.
Instead of earning the assigned income y every period, it can then be favorable for an
individual to earn y − ǫ today and y + ǫ tomorrow. Average gross income would be
the same, however, due to concavity of T(y) the tax burden would decrease; if this ef-
fect is strong enough, it might compensate for the higher disutility of labor. In reality
such strategic behavior to exploit the non-linearity of the tax system seems unlikely
to occur. The reason is that shifting labor income between periods in such a way is
often very costly or simply infeasible due to adjustment costs and hours restrictions.22
Formally, let ˜ C(y∗) denote the present value of total adjustment costs of an individual
that chooses income history y∗, and if y∗
Te+1 = y∗
Te+2 = ... = y∗
T, then ˜ C(y∗) = 0, so if
labor supply is constant, there are no adjustment costs.
Deﬁnition For a given adjustment cost function ˜ C( ), an income tax schedule T(y,z)
istaxarbitrageresistant, ifV (y∗,c∗(y∗,T(y,z(θ)), ˜ C(y∗)) ≤ V (ytruth(θ,a),ctruth(θ,a)) ∀ y∗
and ∀ (θ,a), where c∗(y∗,T(y), ˜ C(y∗)) is the optimal consumption sequence given y∗,
21Theoretically it could be the case that G is (partly) decreasing in z if c1(θ) is sufﬁciently decreasing.
However, this is rather unlikely and in all our numerical examples we have c′
1(θ) > 0.
22For a recent treatment of hours constraint in the public economics literature see Chetty, Friedman,
Olsen and Pistaferri (2011); for the implications of adjustment costs on hours choices and the labor
supply elasticity see Chetty (2011).
26T(y) and V ( , ) is the respective (deterministic) working life utility conditional on the
realization of a.
With this in mind, we make the following assumption stating that strategic deviations
are never feasible for a worker because of adjustment costs:
Assumption 4: The adjustment cost function ˜ C( ) is such that the income tax sched-
ules T(y,z) with T(y(θ,a),z(θ)) = y(θ,a) − cw(θ,a) are tax arbitrage resistant.
This allows to implement constrained efﬁcient allocation using a labor tax system
that conditions on current income and one’s education level only, summarized in the
following corollary:
Corollary 4.3. Assume that Assumption 4 holds. Then any constrained Pareto optimal al-
location in a T-period economy can be implemented by a grant schedule G(z), an education
dependent income tax T(y,z) with T(y(θ,a),z(θ)) = y(θ,a) − cw(θ,a) and a savings tax
T s(s).
Proof. By Assumption 4 we know that individuals prefer yT(θ,a) over any income
sequence where y is not constant over time. By incentive compatibility we know that
each individual prefers yT(θ,a) over yT(θ,a′) ∀ a′,a; combining this with the insights
of Proposition 4.1 yields the result.
4.2 Implementation Two: Student Loans with Income-Contingent
Repayment
4.2.1 Two Periods
The previous implementation required that people with the same income but differ-
ent levels of education pay different taxes. In reality people might perceive this as
a violation of horizontal equity concerns, which could hinder the political feasibility
of such policies. In this light we now present a more appealing alternative imple-
mentation with only one labor income tax schedule and a repayment scheme of the
education grant.23 Technically, this can be seen as a simple reinterpretation of the pre-
vious implementation – we take the tax system of the θ as the common labor income
tax schedule and introduce an income-contingent repayment schedule, which condi-
tions on the size of the loan.24 Together both instruments are sufﬁcient to replicate the
optimal labor wedges. Formally we summarize this in the following proposition:
23Diamond and Saez (2011) argue in a recent contribution that practical policy prescription from
optimal tax models should not go against common hold normative views (horizontal equity for exam-
ple) and limit complexity to a reasonable degree. The second implementation seems in line with these
recommendations.
24Related implementations are of course possible where the tax function of another θ-type can be
the labor income tax schedule in place. In fact, somehow anything goes. The extreme case would just
27Proposition 4.4. A constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a two-period economy can be
implemented by a Loan schedule L(z), a Loan Repayment Schedule Γ(y,L), an income tax
T(y) and a savings tax T s(s), where
• L(z(θ)) = z(θ) + c1(θ)
• Γ(y(θ,a),L(z(θ))) = c2(θ,˜ a(θ,y(θ,a))) − c2(θ,a) if y ∈ [y(θ,a),y(θ,a)] and
Γ(y(θ,a),L(z(θ))) = y(θ,a) − c2(θ,a) otherwise.
• T(y) = y − c2(θ,˜ a(θ,y)) ∀ y ∈ [y(θ,a),y(θ,a)] and T = 0 otherwise.
• T s(s) as deﬁned in Appendix A.5.
where ˜ a(θ,y) is the inverse of y(θ, ) for a.
Proof. The budget constraint of an individual reads as:
c1(θ) + z(θ) ≤ L(z(θ))
c2(θ,a) ≤ y(θ,a) − T(y(θ,a)) − Γ(y(θ,a),L(z(θ))),
which is equivalent to the budget constraint in Implementation 1 since by deﬁnition
G(z) = L(z) ∀ z and T(y,z) = T(y) + Γ(y,z) ∀ y,z. Hence it is a direct consequence of
Proposition 4.1.
4.2.2 T Periods
We will now show to what extend these results carry over to the case of T-periods.
Corollary 4.5. Any constrained Pareto optimal allocation in a T-period economy can be im-
plemented by a Loan schedule L(z), a Loan Repayment Schedule Γt(yt,L), an income tax
Tt(yt) and a savings tax T s(s).
In the same way as Corollary 4.2 follows from Proposition 4.1, this Corollary fol-
lows from Proposition 4.4, we therefore omit a formal proof. Now we show that using
Assumption 4 the dependence of these policy instruments on the histories of incomes
can be overcome.
Corollary 4.6. Assume that Assumption 4 holds. Then any constrained Pareto optimal allo-
cation in a T-period economy can be implemented by a Loan schedule L(z), a Loan Repayment
Schedule Γ(y,L), that is constant over time, an income tax T(y) that is constant over time
and a savings tax T s(s).
be to say that income taxes do not exist and all schedules that were interpreted as history dependent
labor income schedules in implementation 1 can now be interpreted as repayment schedules. Taking
the labor income tax schedule of the θ-type, however, seems to be more natural in our view. Especially
in our application of the theory in Section 5.
28Again we omit a formal proof as the result follows from Corollary 4.5 in the same
way as Corollary 4.3 follows from Corollary 4.2. The implementation is appealing,
since isthere isonlyone labortaxschedule anda yearlyincome contingent repayment
plan for each loan size.
5 AnApplicationoftheModel: Collegevs. High-School
We now present an empirically driven application of our model. We limit education
to be a binary instead of a continuous choice. Agents either enter the labor market
directly after high-school graduation or go to college before working. Additionally,
we restrict the analysis to two different levels of innate ability.25 These simpliﬁca-
tions enable us to parameterize the model using factual and, importantly, estimated
counterfactual earnings distributions from the empirical labor literature (Cunha and
Heckman 2007, 2008). Further the simpliﬁcation hasthe advantage that itis easyto in-
corporate foregone earnings as an implicit cot of education. As laid out in Proposition
3.4, these counterfactual terms contribute to optimal marginal tax rates by deterring
deviations. The simpliﬁed model, arguably, also comes a step closer to more practical
policy recommendations, since the optimum can be implemented with considerably
less complexity; one non-linear labor income tax schedule and one non-linear repay-
ment schedule for college loans will sufﬁce in the application.
5.1 Parametrization
Agents live for 49 years after they graduate from high-school (age 16-65). Afterwards
they enter the labor market directly, or decide to go to college and graduate in four
years. We label the two innate types θHS and θCO and assume that it is a priori optimal
that θHS chooses the lower educational attainment (high school) and that θCO chooses
the highereducational attainment (college). Wesolve for the utilitarian optimum. The




















25This strong assumption implies that all individuals with the same education level are ex-ante
equal, which is clearly not realistic. It can be seen as an indispensable approximation, which we need
to make in order to identify innate types from real world data.


















Figure 5: Earnings Distributions
where g(a|CO,θCO) is the factual ability distribution of college graduates and
g(a|HS,θCO) is the counterfactual ability distribution; i.e. the distribution that would
result if they entered the labor market directly. Note that college types now have to
be compensated for their foregone labor earnings, the implicit cost of college educa-
tion. We have abstracted from this in the full model for simplicity in Sections 2-4,
but add it here for realism. To get the ability distributions, we take the factual and
counterfactual earnings distributions for high-school graduates plotted in Cunha and
Heckman (2007) in Figures 1 and 2.26 Since they consider the present value of life-
time earnings (18-65), we take a 47 years annuity with the same present value, i.e. we
take something similar to average annual earnings. After using a Kernel smoother
(bandwidth=5000), we append a Pareto tail at earnings of $86,000 and truncate the
earnings distributions at $350,000. The resulting relevant distributions are illustrated
(for earnings up to $150,000) in Figure 5.27 Given a (linear) approximation of the real
world tax system we calibrate the implied skill distributions as input for the model
from the optimality conditions of the agents.28 The share of high school and college
types are set to 64.19% and 35.81%, respectively, as reported in Cunha and Heckman
26We used the software GetData Graph Digitizer to read out the data from the graphs.
27The counterfactual earnings distribution for high school graduates is not represented since it is
only relevant for constrained Pareto optimal policies if the incentive constraint of type θHS is binding,
which is only true if the planner wants to redistribute in favor of the more able types θCO; i.e. not in
the here considered utilitarian case.
28Saez (2001) has pioneered the approach to calibrate skills distributions from actual income distri-
butions. We employ the same approximation as in the calibration of the full model in Section 3.4. This
has been found to give a good ﬁt to the US tax system by Jaquet, Lehmann, and Von der Linden (2011).





















Figure 6: Optimal Marginal Tax Rates
(2008). Following Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2011) we set the annual monetary
cost of college education to $7,900.29 The ﬂow utility function, the yearly discount
factor and the interest rate take the same values as in Section 3.4.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Two Income Tax Schedules
Figure 6 shows the optimal implicit marginal tax rates as a function of yearly income
up to $150,000 for high school and college graduates. By Corollary 4.3 there exists
an implementation, in which these schedules are equal to explicit labor income tax
schedules. In combination with Figure 5, one can see in which way tax distortions are
tailored to the different skill/earnings distributions. Since the hump of skill distribu-
tion is shifted to the right for college graduates, labor wedges are shifted to the right,
too. Further, marginal labor distortions are very high for low income earners with col-
lege degree since the mass of those is very small compared to the mass of those with
college degree and high earnings. At income levels of around $100,000 both systems
converge to roughly the same top marginal tax rate of 53%. The incentive effect (part
B of the optimal tax formula in Proposition 3.4) contributes very little to the optimal
29According to ‘Education Digest’ and ‘Student Financing of Undergraduate Education:1999-2000’,
published by the National Centre for Education Statistics (NCES), the average yearly college tuition
was 7.900 US-$ in the year 2000.























Figure 7: Yearly Repayment
high school tax schedule. Ignoring it would yield optimal tax rates, which differ by
0.17% percentage points on average (weighted by income and density). This is consis-
tent with Figure 5 showing that college types only have a slight distributional advan-
tage over high school types, conditional on entering the labor market directly after
high school. So, although the model requires counterfactual distribution to include
the inﬂuence of dynamic incentive effects deterring deviations, these effects seem to
have a negligible impact on optimal marginal tax rates. This suggests that even with-
out estimates of distributions for counterfactual education choices, meaningful tax
simulations can be conducted.
5.2.2 One Income Tax Schedule and Repayments for College Graduates
By Corollary 4.6 one can interpret the marginal tax rates of the θHS-type(s) in Fig-
ure 6 as marginal tax rates of an income tax schedule common to all individuals. The
marginal tax rates for the θCO-type in Figure 6 can, instead, also be interpreted as the
aggregate of marginal distortion through the income tax and an income-dependent
loan repayment schedule. The loan repayment schedule yielding the correct aggre-
gate marginal distortions is illustrated in Figure 7. Repayment ﬁrst increases with
income and then drastically decreases before it converges.30 One might wonder why
the schedule is not increasing in y as an insurance device against labor market risk.
The reason is that the labor income tax schedule also acts as an insurance device and
actually their interaction yields optimal insurance. The common income tax schedule
30It still decreases slightly in the graph, however, this is due to the truncation of the distribution
made in our simulation. If the distributions were unbounded, the loan repayment would converge as
long as the term B(Y ) in the labor wedge formula is negligible, which is the case in our simulations.
32is tailored to optimally insure the θHS-type against labor market risk. The repayment
schedule for the college grants corrects this schedule to ﬁt to the skill distribution of
the θCO-type(s). For very low incomes marginal distortions on labor supply should
be higher for the θCO-type(s) for them being very unlikely to be that unskilled; as
a consequence that repayment schedule is increasing for low incomes. At incomes
of around $60,000 marginal tax rates drastically increase due to the properties of the
skill distribution of the θHS-type(s), which does not ﬁt with the skill distribution of the
θCO-types since their mass at that income level is still very high. As a consequence,
the repayment schedule has to counteract the income tax schedule and therefore dras-
tically decrease in income in this area. For higher incomes where labor distortions of
the θCO-type(s) and the θHS-type(s) converge to the same value, the repayment sched-
ule does not have to counteract the income tax schedule in any way and therefore
becomes ﬂat.31
5.2.3 Average Tax Burdens
We now turn to optimal average tax distortions across education levels. Working
in the implementation with one tax schedule and an income contingent repayment
plan, the average tax rate for college graduates reﬂects the average labor income tax
rate plus repayment divided by gross income. Figure 8(a) illustrates these average
tax rates for incomes above $20,000. That average taxes are higher for θCO-types at
every income level is not a surprise since the repayment is positive for each income
level. In this context the standard concept of an average tax rate may be misleading,
however, since college graduates receive transfers to ﬁnance their consumption and
educational expenses when in college. A concept that better indicates the average
burden a θCO-type has to bear, is a corrected average tax rate deﬁned by (T(y) −
La)/y where La is be the annuity payment, if individuals had to repay the loan at the
market interest rate, and T(y) is the labor tax paid at income y. Figure 8(b) displays
these corrected average tax rates. For incomes up to roughly 45.000 US-$ effective
average tax rates are lower for college graduates; intuitively college graduates receive
insurance against bad labor market outcomes by repaying only little amounts. Then
for incomes up to roughly $80,000 θCO-types pay higher corrected average tax rates.
For higher incomes the pattern reverses. The graph might even suggest that college
31This last result hinges on the assumption that the tail of the skill distributions is characterized by
the same Pareto parameter. Estimating the Pareto parameter separately for the income distribution
of individuals with college degree and without might provide interesting insights for the optimal de-
sign of such repayment schedules. If, e.g., the Pareto parameter is smaller for college graduates this
might call for a higher top tax rate for college graduates than for individuals with a college degree (see
Saez 2001), which could be implemented as a repayment schedule that is linearly increasing for high
incomes.





























(a) Average Tax Rates































(b) Effective Average Tax Rates
Figure 8: Average Tax Rates
types pay lower effective average tax rates in expectation, and hence repay less then
the actuarially fair annuity every year on average. However, since a big mass of θCO-
types earns income between $45,000 and $85,000 the opposite is true: The expected
yearlyrepaymentis$563abovetheannuity. Theprovision ofloansbythegovernment
to college students, hence, serves two roles: 1) It circumvents possible credit market
frictions by providing liquidity through income contingent loans. 2) On average, it
increases the implicit interest on that loans to be able to redistribute from θCO to θHS-
types.
5.3 Education As a Tag?
We have shown that in constrained Pareto optima labor wedges condition on edu-
cation. This feature of optimal policies bears resemblance with a simple tagging pol-
icy, ﬁrst put forward by Akerlof (1978) and more recently investigated by Cremer
Gahvari, and Lozachmeur (2010), Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) as well as Weinzierl
(2011). Moreover, the simulations of optimal policies in the previous Section as well
as Section 3.4 suggested that incentive effects contribute quantitatively very little to
optimal labor wedges. This might suggest that self-selection into education, does not
constrain the planner’sproblem signiﬁcantly, and ignoringthe incentive constraint (8)
for the θCO-type and simply condition the labor tax code on education would result
in similar optimal policies.
We will now argue why this is misleading. We, therefore, compute an allocation
with such a simple tagging policy.32 Figure 9 illustrates the resulting effective aver-
age tax rates. Effective average taxes for college graduates are higher everywhere,
32The only difference is that now the planner does not take (8) into account.






























Figure 9: Effective Average Tax Rates Under Simple Tagging
indicating that a simple tag policy results in an allocation giving strong incentives for
high innate types to deviate, i.e. entering the labor market directly. This becomes
more stark when considering the expected yearly premium over the actuarially fair
annuity, which is now $4102 – about a sevenfold increase in comparison with the
constrained optimum taking incentive effects into account. In contrast, labor wedges
stay almost unaffected in comparison to the constrained optimum, consistent with the
small quantitative effect of the incentive term we found in the previous Sections.33
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the implications of endogenous education decisions
on optimal tax policies in a general dynamic environment with heterogeneous agents
and uncertainty. Putting no exogenous restrictions on available instruments, we were
particularly interested which polices with real world appeal could implement the op-
timum. An attractive way to decentralize Pareto optimal allocations is to have the
government support students to ﬁnance consumption and tuition during education.
During their working life students pay back these loans, contingent on income and
loan size. We have put the model to work illustrating our policy recommendations for
the case of a binary education choice: graduating from college or entering the labor
market directly after high-school. This enabled us to use empirical income distribu-
tions to parameterize the model and interpret it with respect to results from the static
33A similar logic applies in the model of Scheuer (2011) with endogenous occupational choices.
In his model, individuals choose to become an entrepreneur or worker. So although the optimal tax
system in his model conditions on occupations, this is differentfrom a pure tag because of endogenous
sorting into occupations.
35literature (Saez 2001). The labor wedge of college graduates as a function of income
lies ﬁrst strictly above their counterparts from high-school, but this reverses at higher
incomes. The optimal repayment plan is hump-shaped and college graduates pay a
slightly positive premium over the actuarially fair annuity in expectation.
We have abstracted from some several elements, which can be tackled in future
work. For example, the planner had full commitment to honor all utility promises
and deliver by history dependent distortions. Relaxing this assumption by incorpo-
rating political economy aspects could yield interesting insights. There could be an
additional force tohave adecreasingeducation subsidy; thiskeepsinequalityin check
and thereby strengthens credibility, which in turn mitigates the detrimental effects of
the lack of commitment on human capital investment. This would counteract the role
of increasing subsidies to offset the effect of progressive taxes, we found dominating
in our numerical section (Figure 4). This idea that current policies inﬂuence future
credibility has recently been put forward by Farhi, Sleet, Werning, and Yeltekin (2011)
for the case of capital taxation.
Finally, our simulation have shown that counterfactual distribution have a quanti-
tatively small contribution to optimal marginal tax rates. So even without the avail-
ability of counterfactual earnings distribution, meaningful tax simulation can be con-
ducted for other countries than the US.
A Appendix
A.1 Properties of the Laissez-Faire Allocation










































































da > 0, (11)
applying the envelope theorem and integrating by parts several times, as well as all
three assumptions on the conditional distribution function. Also note that
∂y(s,a)
∂s < 0,
simply because of income effects.
36A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Consider some admissible reporting strategy r(θ) = θ′.
∂U(θ,θ′)
∂r(θ)









































































We are now looking when this last expression always has the same sign as the dif-
ference (θ − θ′), which is clearly sufﬁcient for global incentive compatibility. For




∂θ in a truthful mechanism is increasing in a. This can be shown to be equivalent
to
∂y(θ,a)
∂θ > 0 using the envelope theorem. The second line is positive if
∂z(θ′)
∂r(θ) > 0 or
equivalently
∂z(θ)
∂θ > 0 in a truthful mechanism. The last condition (iii) is a routine
exercise and a proof can be found, for example in Salanié (2003).













































































′(c1(θ))( ˜ f(θ) − η
′(θ)) − λRf(θ) = 0 (c1SB)
 













η(θ) = 0 (v2SB)
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da − λRf(θ) = 0
(zSB)
A.4 Proofs of Propositions 3.3-3.5
A.4.1 Proposition 3.3

































au′ and λRg(a|z,θ)f(θ) and using the deﬁnition of the labor wedge, i.e.















which can be written as
τy(θ,a)
1 − τ(θ,a)














εc(θ,a) can be shown by simple algebra, see Saez (2001, p.227).
In particular, with the isoelastic speciﬁcation used in the computations
(y/a)σ
σ one can
verify that this term is equal to 1
σ.














































Using the inverse Euler equation, the term A(θ,a) can be written as in Proposi-
tion 3.3.
From (c1SB), η(θ) is given by:











u′(c1(θ))f(θ)dθ, transformed into utils by λR.
Relation to the formula of Saez (2001)
The insurance part of the labor wedge can be expressed as in Saez (2001), for our
case with separable preferences. This relation applies if agents do not differ ex-ante.
















































where the second equality follows from the transversality condition. This term can be
expressed as in Saez (2001) as shown by Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009) in their
online appendix.
40A.4.3 Proposition 3.5
























da − λRf(θ) = 0
Proposition 3.5 directly follows.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Starting from a direct mechanism we show in four steps that optimal allocations can
indeed be implemented with the policy instruments as deﬁned in Proposition A.5.
Step 1: Introduce savings
Imagine the constrained efﬁcient allocation is implemented by a direct mechanism.
From that point on, assume that individuals could freely save s. With savings tax
T s(s,r1), the budget constraints read as
˜ c1(r1) + s = c1(r1) (12)
˜ c2(r1,r2) = c2(r1,r2) + Rs − T
s(s,r1) (13)
Deﬁne the optimal report r2 about a, for a given report r1 about θ, a given savings













Then the optimal report in period 1, for a given level of savings and a given savings






















Then deﬁne a hypothetical tax schedule T ∗(r1,s,θ) for eaach θ implicitely by




41This hypothetical tax schedule would make individuals of type θ indifferent between
truth telling and the optimal joint deviation for any s. It is hypothetical since it does
not only depend on the report r1, which is observable but also on the unobservable
type θ. However, we know that for each θ such a tax schedule exists. Therefore taking
the upper envelope over these functions, we deﬁne ˆ T(s,r1) by




Lemma A.1. A constrained efﬁcient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism
extended by a savings choice and history dependent savings tax schedules ˆ T s(s,r1).
Step 2: Make the savings tax history independent
A simple way to make the savings tax history-independent is to take the upper






Lemma A.2. A constrained efﬁcient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism
extended by a savings choice and history independent savings tax schedules T s(s).
Step 3: Allow for labor-leisure decisions
To get closer to a decentralized implementation now assume the following ex-
tended direct mechanism.
1. Individuals report r(θ)
2. They get assigned ’income to consume’ c1(θ)
3. They face the savings tax schedule T s(s) and save s(θ) = 0
4. In period two, instead of directly revealing their type, individuals of type θ face
an income tax schedule that is deﬁned by
T(y(θ,a),θ) = y(θ,a) − c2(θ,a)) ∀ a
By the same arguments as in the standard Mirrlees model it follows that this ex-
tended direct mechanism can also implement the constrained efﬁcient allocations.
We can summarize this in the following lemma.
Lemma A.3. A constrained efﬁcient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism in
the ﬁrst period extended by a savings choice and a history independent differentiable savings
tax schedule ˜ T s(s) and a history dependent labor income tax schedule T(Y,z) in period two.
42Step 4: Complete Decentralization - allow for educational investment
1. Individuals buy (or tell the government that they want to buy) z(θ) units of
education
2. They get assigned a student loan G(z(θ)) = c1(θ) + z(θ) (and are obliged to
actually buy z(θ) units of education)
3. They face the savings tax schedule T s(s) and save s(θ) = 0
4. in period two, instead of directly revealing their type, individuals of type θ face
an income tax schedule that is deﬁned by
T(y(θ,a),z(θ)) = y(θ,a) − c2(θ,a) ∀ a
Since the mechanism in step 4 is just a reformulation of the mechanism in step 3
this directly leads us to Proposition 4.1.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Once θ is revealed, it is a direct consequence of Werning (2007, Appendix IV) that
there exists a tax system Tt(yt) for every θ that leads to truth telling of a conditional
on θ being revealed. It then directly follows that a capital tax as deﬁned in steps 2 of




A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.3
By Assumption 5 we know that individuals prefer yT(θ,a) over any income sequence
where y is not constant over time. By incentive compatibility we know that each indi-
vidual prefers yT(θ,a) over yT(θ,a′) ∀ a′,a. Then it follows that a history independent
tax schedule T(y,z)in every period with T(y(θ,a),z(θ) = y(θ,a)−cw(θ,a) implements
the allocation.
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